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LIF TING THE FOG OF TARGETING
“Autonomous Weapons” and Human Control through the Lens of
Military Targeting
Merel A. C. Ekelhof

A

utonomous weapon systems (AWSs) have generated one of the most heated
recent debates about the laws of war and military ethics. The issue of autonomous weapons flows from the concern that human beings will lose control
over the weapons they use, and hence no longer will be deciding matters of life
and death. Consequently, most states, participants (e.g., elements of civil society),
and commentators agree that autonomous weapons require some level of human
control. Different terms are introduced to reflect the premise that humans should
control or interact with the autonomous system; meaningful human control, appropriate levels of human judgment, and intelligent partnership are examples of
this general concept. But there is no agreement on what these concepts mean, or
what exactly should be subject to this control: the weapon itself, its critical functions, or each individual attack.1
This article argues that, to gain a better understanding of what the concept of meaningful human control (by whatever name) means in a context of
increasingly autonomous weapons, we should
Merel A. C. Ekelhof holds an LLM in the law and
focus our attention first and foremost on what
politics of international security from and is a PhD
candidate at VU University Amsterdam. She is a should be considered targeting. Military targetvisiting researcher at the Harvard Law School Proing practices within which this human control
gram on International Law and Armed Conflict
is, or ought to be, exercised should be the core
and a research fellow of the Centre for the Politics of
Transnational Law. Her research—commissioned by of any analysis. The context within which these
the Netherlands Ministries of Defense and Foreign
systems are used and human control is exercised
Affairs—examines the effect of increasingly autonomous technologies on military decision-making.
is essential to determining what human-machine
relationship we require, now and potentially
© 2018 by Merel A. C. Ekelhof
in the future. Therefore, the article discusses
Naval War College Review, Summer 2018, Vol. 71, No. 3
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018

NWC_Summer2018Review.indb 61

1

5/1/18 11:10 AM

62

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 3, Art. 6

autonomous weapons through the lens of military targeting—more specifically,
the targeting process.
There seems to be a considerable lack of knowledge and understanding about
targeting among individual members of the public, as well as many groups that
represent the public in some way, such as lawyers, nongovernmental organizations, political leaders, industry, scientists, and the press. This lack of knowledge
about targeting is reflected in the discourse on autonomous weapons—which
is where it becomes particularly precarious, because of repeated calls to regulate and limit military practices.2 Although not all individuals engaging in the
discourse on autonomous weapons need to understand targeting to the degree
that military professionals should, the discourse would benefit profoundly from
a more informed discussion regarding targeting practices, as this would provide
insight into how the implementation of autonomous technologies will impact
targeting decisions and human control.
This article will demonstrate that negotiating and exercising control occurs
throughout the entire targeting process, and that introducing autonomous technologies into the process could lead to a loss of human control but does not inevitably do so. The manner in which a concept such as meaningful human control is
interpreted depends on the context within which it is or ought to be applied; thus,
how does the targeting process inform our discussion about control?
Answering that question requires first gaining a better understanding of what
targeting is and what it is not. The first section of the article discusses the sixphase decision-making cycle that has developed over the course of history and
has become embedded in the training for and execution of NATO (i.e., mostly
Western) military operations; Western militaries refer to this as the targeting
process.3
The second section of the article discusses one phase of the targeting process—
phase 2: target development—in more detail. This detailed analysis serves two
purposes: (1) It demonstrates the complexity of the targeting process, including
the different layers of decision-making involved; while target selection may seem
to be a straightforward task, it requires much more deliberate planning than a
game of Whac-A-Mole, in which one simply attacks anything one considers a
target. (2) It reconsiders what qualifies as a critical function of targeting. In the
discourse on AWSs, critical functions are related to the weapon itself, and mostly
are described as those that require human control in their execution, owing to
their importance for targeting (i.e., their causal relationship to kinetic effects,
and thus to potential death and destruction). Yet I argue that a critical function
such as target selection is considered during multiple phases of the targeting
process and need not have any direct connection to weapons use or kinetic action.4 Therefore, instead of focusing discussions on autonomous weapons—the
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss3/6
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dominant approach of the past decade or so—we ought to be focusing on autonomous targeting.
Thus, the third section of the article addresses the development of autonomous technologies—not weapons (although practically any technology can be
weaponized)—in the targeting process. There already are many ongoing military
projects in the field of artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning, autonomy,
and automation that can provide case studies on how these technologies affect
the processes in which they operate and how that relates to human control.5
These developments appear to arise, first and foremost, within the intelligence
branches of militaries, because of the massive increase in (and demand for) intelligence, in both quantity and quality, and because rapidly changing battle spaces
demand accelerated decision-making. Although intelligence often is considered
targeting support, it arguably can be said that intelligence personnel perform approximately 85 to 90 percent of targeting.6 Thus, the role of intelligence and the
development and use of autonomous technologies for targeting will be discussed
together in the third part of the article to determine how these technologies affect
human control in the process and what challenges we can identify already.
The article’s final section draws some tentative conclusions about how my approach informs the debate on human control. Autonomous technologies should
not be conceived as replacements for humans; rather, their introduction to the
targeting process changes the tasks and activities of human actors. On the one
hand, humans might be able to increase their control, instead of losing it, owing
to improved situational awareness and a better understanding of the operational
environment. On the other hand, introducing autonomous technologies into the
targeting process presents fundamental challenges, not only to military structures
and the military mind-set, but most importantly to decision-making processes
and the relationships between human actors and technologies in the targeting
process. If these challenges are not considered carefully, the use of autonomous
technologies for targeting could result in an unacceptable loss of control.
The article provides an in-depth analysis of military practices, procedures,
and experiences that goes beyond that available from general, publicly accessible
sources. It can be difficult for a civilian to gain access to materials concerning
military targeting, owing to the obvious sensitivities concerning the subject and
the resultant restrictions placed on related information. Nevertheless, I was able
not only to access those documents but also to conduct field research by participating in conferences, targeting courses, and wargames; observing simulations
and exercises; and conducting formal interviews and informal conversations
with over fifty military practitioners. These practitioners came from different
backgrounds, nationalities, command centers, and offices and represented a
broad variety of experience in targeting; they included targeteers, operators,
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
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military planners, intelligence officers, weaponeers, commanders, and legal advisers.7 This methodology was necessary to address the matter at hand, since to
comprehend targeting one must go beyond doctrine and include the experience
of military specialists. It is through the prism of their experiences that we can
begin to understand the complexity of targeting, current targeting practices, and
contemporary targeting dilemmas—such as the control issue that autonomous
technologies raise.
The article thus provides an insider’s perspective, yet is suitable for public
release and relevant to both civilians and military practitioners. Its purposes are,
first, to contribute to contemporary debates—primarily the discourse on autonomous weapons—through a critical and honest analysis of military targeting
practices in light of the demand for and development of increasingly autonomous
technologies for targeting; and, second, to provide a more holistic assessment of
the effect of increasingly autonomous technologies on the human role within the
targeting process, and the challenge of safely implementing these technologies
while preserving human control.
TARGETING AS A PROCESS, NOT AN ACTION
Historically, targeting could be described essentially as the practice of destroying enemy forces and equipment. Classic targeting mainly focused on achieving
victory through military kinetic lethal actions that were related directly to an enemy’s military wherewithal. Targeting was primarily a tactical exercise, a process
that was executed predominantly on the battlefield.
Examples of this interpretation of targeting still appear in daily news reports.
Popular news sources such as Al Jazeera, CNN, the BBC, and Reuters regularly
publish headlines such as “Netanyahu: Strikes in Syria Targeted Hezbollah Arms,”
“Air Strike on Mosque near Aleppo in Syria Kills 42: Monitor,” and “U.S.: ‘Jihadi
John’ Targeted in Drone Strike.”8 For many, when confronted with awful images
of bloodshed, the urge to point the finger too frequently triumphs over the need
for a more measured, considered analysis of what actually occurred.9 Although it
is difficult to generalize about the international media, such publications seem to
adopt the historical approach to targeting, which focuses primarily on the effect
of an attack. This tells us very little about contemporary targeting.
Arguably, targeting—in the contemporary meaning of the concept—did not
evolve until the introduction of airpower in World War I.10 Today, targeting—
after a long evolutionary process and enabled by technological developments—
has developed into a practice that aims to achieve specified effects on and beyond
the battlefield by means of not only classic kinetic lethal actions (e.g., employing bombs, guns, torpedoes) but also nonmilitary, nonkinetic, and nonlethal
activities (e.g., financial effects, electronic warfare, psychological warfare, and
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss3/6
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information operations; the Russian interference in the American election arguably could fall within this definition).11 No longer did targeting aim to achieve
effects on the battlefield only; it became increasingly important to achieve effects
in all domains and on all levels—the strategic, operational, and tactical. Nowadays, it would be more appropriate to describe targeting as a decision-making
cycle that is deliberate, not ad hoc; iterative; and methodical in planning actions
against adversary targets to achieve the effects needed to meet strategic and operational campaign objectives.12 This effects-based approach, with a particular
focus on linking strategic-, operational-, and tactical-level effects, also is reflected
in military doctrine, some of which is publicly accessible.13
In the following paragraphs this doctrine will be explored further, for two
main reasons. First, if we continue to consider targeting according to the historical interpretation—as an isolated tactical act—rather than as a deliberate process,
we will not be able to address effectively the control issue that technological
innovation raises. Second, this “helicopter view” of the process is necessary to
contextualize the next part of this article, which zooms in on phase 2 of the targeting process to give a detailed analysis of the different considerations, tasks,
and decisions that are made within this phase. It should provide well-grounded
knowledge on how Western militaries currently exercise human control in the
process within which, ultimately, increasingly autonomous technologies already
are or will be employed.
One of the most significant documents on targeting—a cornerstone in NATO
targeting operations—is the NATO publication Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting, AJP-3.9. It provides a framework of principles, practices, and procedures,
the clear understanding and acceptance of which are a prerequisite for NATO targeting operations.14 The publication aims to guide NATO military forces in their
actions by explaining how targeting is planned, conducted, and assessed through
six phases.15 Although aimed at guiding NATO military forces, this document
also could and should be used to educate laymen, providing them with the (unclassified) information necessary to grasp sufficiently the practice of targeting.
While AJP-3.9 is the authoritative conceptual basis for joint targeting, it clearly
states that “it requires judgment in application.”16 Targeting is contextual, and
hence any document, doctrine, or rule book requires translation into the specific
context. Much like the laws of armed conflict, this doctrine is to be interpreted
by professionals to ensure careful application of its principles and procedures in
the practical world. Hence, reciting the doctrine as part of this article would be
of little use. To understand targeting practices, difficulties, and challenges, one
must include the experience of military specialists. It is through the prism of
their experiences that we can begin to understand current targeting practices—
the complexity of targeting, as well as contemporary targeting dilemmas. I
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
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will incorporate their voices as well as my own experiences gained in targeting
courses, exercises, and conferences into the analysis of the targeting process in
subsequent parts of this article.
AJP-3.9 defines joint targeting as the process that “links strategic-level direction and guidance with tactical targeting activities through the operational-level
targeting cycle in a focused and systemic manner to create specific physical and
psychological effects to reach military objectives and the desired end state.”17
More specifically, joint targeting can be described by the six phases involved (the
number of phases can vary depending on the doctrine, but the steps are essentially the same). Together, these six phases form a cycle that may seem sequential
but is, in reality, iterative and bidirectional; sometimes phases are achieved simultaneously, and they also can overlap.
Before this targeting process commences with the first phase and formal
military planning is initiated, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), comprising
permanent representatives of the member states, must decide that military intervention is required by issuing a NAC initiating directive.18 Once strategic-level
assessments have been made, the NAC will provide the Military Committee (the
senior military authority in NATO) with political guidance, overarching military
objectives, and the desired end state for a campaign, including any constraints
and restraints it wishes to impose. This guidance is the framework within which
military operations can take place. The political guidance from NAC incorporates diplomatic, economic, and military considerations and is often very broad
and vague.19 These political and strategic objectives and guidance include approved target sets, as well as possible priority targets called time-sensitive targets
(TSTs).20 This guidance is passed down to the joint force commander (JFC), who
is responsible for the execution of the campaign.21 Then the targeting process
commences.
Phase 1: Commander’s Intent, Objectives, and Guidance
The impact of the political and strategic objectives and guidance will be experienced first in phase 1. The JFC must identify clearly, at the operational level, what
is to be accomplished, under what circumstances, and within what parameters,
while following the political and strategic objectives and taking into consideration any constraints and restraints imposed by the NAC and, if provided, the
mandate. Because the JFC derives his or her military campaign objectives from
the mandate of a particular operation, the political objectives should be unambiguously clear and well-defined to facilitate the development of feasible military
objectives.22
Once the military campaign objectives are defined, the first activity of the joint
targeting process is to take these objectives, guidance (including restrictions with
regard to collateral damage), and intent and further translate them into a number
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss3/6
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of discrete operational tasks.23 This is an iterative process conducted between
the JFC and component commanders, one that allows objectives, tasks, and supporting target nominations to be developed on every level (i.e., both joint and
component).24 It ensures that each target can be traced back to clearly defined
and attainable goals for military operations and, perhaps even more important,
that everyone in the targeting process is aware of the objectives and guidance.
But that is not always an easy task. As stated realistically in U.S. Air Force targeting doctrine, “It is easy for those caught up in the daily battle rhythm to become
too focused on tactical-level details, losing sight of objectives, desired effects, or
other aspects of commander’s intent. When this happens, execution can devolve
into blind target servicing, unguided by strategy, with little or no anticipation of
enemy actions.”25
Hence, objectives and guidance are the cornerstone of the targeting process at
each level. They should be clear, concise, measurable, and attainable, driving the
targeting process effectively; but they may turn out to be vague and uninformed,
presenting challenges throughout the targeting process.
Phase 2: Target Development, Validation, Nomination, and Prioritization
Phase 2 covers a range of separate but related activities that go into selecting and
characterizing targets, as well as building the database of knowledge about those
targets. Target development can be described most accurately as having roughly
five functions: target analysis, target vetting, target validation, target nomination,
and target prioritization.
As mentioned previously, the NAC passes down political-strategic guidance
and approved target sets to the JFC. Even though these target sets are relatively
broad, it is clear that the selection of targets is controlled top down and begins
even prior to the commencement of the targeting process.26 The essence and
functions of target development will be explained in more detail in the next part
of this article; for now, suffice it to say that the second phase identifies eligible
targets that can be influenced to achieve the JFC’s objectives, and that the principal output is a joint prioritized target list.27
Phase 3: Capabilities Analysis
Once the actual list of targets that can be engaged has been developed, the next
step is to determine the right asset with which to engage each target.28 Capabilities
analysis is the process of analyzing the prioritized targets and matching to them
the most appropriate capabilities, lethal and nonlethal, to generate the desired
physical or psychological effects.29
This phase has two elements that deserve further deliberation. First, capabilities analyses are sometimes referred to as weaponeering. Weaponeering is
the process of determining the quantity of a specific type of lethal or nonlethal
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
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means required to generate the desired effect on a given target.30 What is the right
asset (e.g., manned asset, remotely piloted asset, or standoff attack munitions)
or weapon (e.g., Hellfire missiles, two-thousand-pound bombs, or nonlethal
means) for engaging this target? Do we have enough of that capability? If not, is
there perhaps another capability that can be substituted for it that still generates
the desired effects?31 The output of weaponeering is a recommendation of the
quantity, type, and mix of lethal and nonlethal weapons needed to achieve the desired effects while avoiding unacceptable collateral damage.32 It also can include
precautions that must be taken to avoid, or at least minimize, incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects. This is the second
element of phase 3, called a collateral damage estimation (CDE).
Issues related to collateral damage already may become apparent during target
development, but they are considered more prominently during the capabilities
analysis. CDE often is confused with weaponeering (and weaponeering with
CDE). Collateral damage is the unintentional or incidental physical damage
to noncombatants, nonmilitary objects, or the environment resulting from an
attack.33 It is estimated as part of the planning process so as to provide the commander with an estimation—not a certainty—of collateral damage to inform his
or her decision prior to target engagement.34 CDE plays a role in the proportionality assessment, as the commander will analyze whether the expected incidental
civilian harm is excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated.35
Phase 4: Commander’s Decision, Force Planning, and Assignment
During this phase, targeting instructions are communicated from the operational
level to the tactical level. The JFC issues a final approval of the prioritized targets
and decides on matching capabilities against these targets. Consequently, the
JFC assigns these targets to the different components for further planning and
execution.36
Any relevant constraints and restraints, whether strict or lenient, that emerged
during these four phases are passed on to the assigned unit.37 Although execution
is assigned to different components (referred to as “decentralized execution”), the
desired objective of the campaign remains centrally controlled.
Phase 5: Mission Planning and Execution
This phase deals directly with the planning and execution of tactical activities.
Now that the prioritized targets have been assigned to the various components,
the detailed mission planning will be performed for the execution of operations.
Tactical-level planners will take similar steps to those described for phases 1–4,
but on a more detailed level. Assessments in this phase take into account operational and legal standards, including the obligation to take feasible precautions
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss3/6
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in attack.38 The component commander receives the prioritized targets on which
he or she will be conducting further mission planning and, eventually, execution.
Once the mission planning has been completed, execution can commence.
Mission execution follows a number of logical steps. This process is referred
to most commonly as the F2T2EA cycle, which stands for “find, fix, track, target,
engage, and assess.”39 It is during this phase that the selected lethal or nonlethal
means will be used. Hence, when debating autonomous weapon systems and the
critical functions of these weapons, this is the phase focused on most. Before the
mission-execution phase, weapons use has been contemplated, but no weapon
yet has been launched, fired, released, or used in any manner.
In the historical approach—which perceives targeting as the achievement of
kinetic effects on the battlefield—focusing on this part of the process would make
perfect sense. However, in contemporary targeting procedures, weapons use is far
from the only critical function of targeting. Other decisions and tasks within the
targeting process are particularly relevant to the discourse on autonomous weapons, and therefore warrant even more attention. Hence, after brief consideration
of the final phase of the process, the next part of this article illustrates this by
providing a detailed analysis of phase 2, during which target development takes
place—arguably the actual critical function of target selection.
Phase 6: Combat Assessment
The assessment seeks to evaluate the effectiveness and lawfulness of executed
operations and aims to guide future operations. If targeting was no more than
dropping munitions on targets, then a battle damage assessment would entail
little more than taking a closer look at the target to see whether the munitions
exploded on the correct coordinates.
However, most of the time effects are not easy to observe; for example, the
destruction of a plane as a direct effect of an attack on an airfield—as part of simultaneous attacks on all the assets of an adversary’s air-defense system, aiming
to, over time, degrade the legitimacy of the regime by portraying it as incapable
of protecting the populace—would offer no easy assessment.40 Although the
munitions’ effect can be assessed relatively easily, the change of popular attitude
is unlikely to be measurable until it is reflected in the target’s behavior, and even
then it is extremely difficult to conduct measurements of effectiveness.41
For similar reasons, it also may be difficult to assess the lawfulness of the
operation. Collateral damage may not always be apparent, particularly in air
campaigns; it might require ground-based assessments to acquire the necessary
information about the weapon’s effects on the target and its surroundings.42
Either way, the results of these assessments feed back into phase 1 so that goals
and tasks can be adjusted accordingly.
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A DETAILED ANALYSIS OF PHASE 2 OF THE TARGETING
PROCESS: TARGET DEVELOPMENT
Considering all six phases of the targeting cycle, phase 2 (target development,
validation, nomination, and prioritization) is one of the more extensive phases,
particularly in terms of time and resources and the involvement of different command levels. Target selection is controlled top down as the NAC passes down
(from the political-strategic level to the operational level) approved target sets;
targets might include ground forces and facilities, air defenses, ballistic missiles,
military supplies and storage facilities, and military or political leadership.43
Target sets even can include civilian installations, but these may be targeted only
if they qualify as legitimate military targets in accordance with the law of armed
conflict and relevant international law.44
Clearly, these target sets are still very broad; hence they require further development in phase 2 of the targeting process. As mentioned previously, phase 2
covers a range of separate but related activities that go into selecting and characterizing targets, as well as building the database of knowledge about those targets.
The five functions of this phase listed earlier—target analysis, vetting, validation,
nomination, and prioritization—will be discussed individually in the paragraphs
below. However, the reader should keep in mind that they are closely related and
in practice not easily separable.
Target Analysis
During target analysis, the most relevant targets linked to strategic and operational objectives are identified together.45 Once the commander’s guidance is
received, the target system analysis (TSA) process begins.46 The TSA is a foundational part of the target-development process, as it enables additional, more
detailed stages of target development; potential targets are derived from the TSA
process.47
TSA products are intended to provide a comprehensive and holistic assessment of an entire target system so that, ultimately, they enable planners to
comprehend a target system’s functions, capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities so they can provide recommended targeting strategies.48 The TSA thus
yields understanding of how components of the enemy system interact and how
the system functions as a whole. This includes physical, logical, and complex social systems, as well as the interactions among them. The TSA approaches targets
and target sets as systems (in keeping with what is known as a system-of-systems
approach) to look at interdependencies and determine vulnerabilities between
systems and exploitable weaknesses that, if disrupted or affected in a specific
manner, will create effects that achieve the commander’s objectives.49 It, thus,
looks beyond the characteristics of a single target; a target’s real importance may
lie in its relationship to other targets within a particular operational system.50
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss3/6
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This is an incredibly challenging task that can take up many months and may
require expertise that goes beyond that normally available.
Consider the task of conducting a TSA for an oil refinery. If you strike the
wrong point, the effects may be devastating. For instance, kinetically attacking
an oil refinery might ignite a large fire, causing additional risks to the population and damaging the refinery beyond repair. Even aside from the high risk
of collateral damage, the costs of striking the refinery itself may be extensive
since, essentially, “you buy what you break.”51 An alternative approach might be
to strike the oil refinery using nonlethal means. Now you need not only experienced targeteers plus someone with extensive knowledge of the oil refinery you
intend to strike, but also experts on nonlethal targeting (an expertise that is still
relatively rare in NATO).
In short, certain targets require more time and expertise to plan for than others. But in any case, TSA is a lengthy process that can take many months, and
hence should begin well in advance of operations—preferably in peacetime.52
Therefore, strictly speaking, TSA might not be considered part of the targeting
process, since the targeting process (within NATO, at least) does not commence
until the NAC determines that military intervention is required and issues its
guidance and objectives. According to a senior defense analyst at the Pentagon,
this is far too late for a true NATO emergency such as a surprise invasion of the
Baltics or Poland; as a result, NATO always will be behind the power curve unless planning can be done earlier, with approved, clear draft objectives already
developed well in advance for particular scenarios.53
However, it is politically sensitive to conduct target system analysis on nations
with which you are not currently in conflict.54 This restricts the ability to conduct TSAs on a national—but mostly a NATO—level, impairing the preparation
process from an intelligence perspective. This could mean that at the start of an
operation there would be no, or very few, prepared targets to strike. As a result,
forces might run out of prepared targets within the first few days or weeks after
the initiation of hostilities and be forced into a mode of primarily reacting to
unanticipated events. At that point, targeting could turn into a game of WhacA-Mole. Fortunately, there are ways to conduct TSAs on an individual national
level so that, once a NATO operation begins and the coalition commences the
planning process, nations can contribute their information to an integrated database, although often with strict limitations. Other opportunities to enhance the
planning process lie in the technological domain, which will be addressed later.
Target Vetting
Target vetting assesses whether the intelligence used to develop the target is correct and ensures that the target performs the specified function for adversaries
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or other actors.55 Consequently, intelligence for target development needs to be
updated and refined continually, making target development an ongoing process
rather than a discrete task.56 Although this may seem a relatively easy task—a
mere “checking” of the target intelligence—the importance of this task must not
be underestimated. As previously explained, target analysis can take a long time.
It is therefore important to vet all the targets before they can be nominated for
engagement. Not doing so could lead to inadvertent engagements and violations
of the laws of armed conflict.
Target Validation
Target validation ensures that the vetted targets are in line with the JFC’s objectives and desired effects, that they are in compliance with relevant international
law and policy, and that the all-source analysis used to develop the targets is accurate and credible.57 During the process of target validation, certain questions
are asked. Does the target meet the JFC’s objectives, guidance, and intent? Is the
target consistent with the laws of armed conflict and the rules of engagement? Is
the desired effect on the target consistent with the desired end state? Is the target
politically or culturally sensitive? What are the risks and likely consequences of
collateral damage? What are the consequences of not attacking the target?58
Finally, during target validation targets also are coordinated and deconflicted
with other operations. Coordination with many other agencies and activities may
be necessary to prevent friendly-fire accidents, collateral damage, or propaganda
leverage for the enemy.59 Coordinating operations, integrating joint fires, and
ensuring deconfliction are all parts of a complex process, especially in a coalition in which national caveats, rules of engagement, a low tolerance for collateral
damage, political constraints, and various legal issues must be taken into consideration on a multinational level. This is not even to mention the challenges that
arise out of the collaboration among and organization of numerous actors from
different military branches and services, and in joint operations from different
nations, resulting in a conglomeration of cultural, organizational, educational,
and linguistic differences.
Target Nomination
Once potential targets are validated, they are nominated by components (air,
land, maritime, and special ops) for approval via the joint coordination process
and identified to be included and prioritized within the joint target list (JTL).60
The JTL is the master list from which all other lists are produced; the joint prioritized target list (JPTL), restricted target list, and no-strike list are all subsets
of the JTL. The JTL provides all known targets within the NAC-approved target
sets considered for engagement. That does not mean, however, that all targets on
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the JTL are already selected for engagement; they still need to be cleared against
the rules of engagement, NATO caveats, and relevant international law.61 For
example, the principle of distinction plays a vital role in this phase, to ensure that
offensive action is directed only against military objectives and combatants, making a clear distinction between them and civilian objects and civilians.62
Target Prioritization
The final clearances discussed above take place during target prioritization, of
which the principal output is the JPTL. Targets on this list have been legally scrutinized, risk assessed, and validated and prioritized in line with the JFC’s desired
effects and guidance. Before targets are placed on the JPTL, they are presented
and discussed in target working groups and boards.
The short version of this process is as follows: Targets are developed and
reviewed multiple times by many different staff and different commands in the
Joint Targeting Working Group. Once fully developed, these targets are presented
to the Joint Targeting Coordination Board, which typically consists of functional
advisers (e.g., legal, political, information-operations, and electronic-warfare
advisers, as required), representatives of the different components (land, maritime, air, and special operations), national representatives, and the commander.63
Different military representatives (e.g., the chief targeteer, legal adviser, director
of operations) will provide the commander with the relevant information. In the
end, the commander will decide whether to approve the presented targets and
place them on the JPTL, or disapprove or suspend them (e.g., owing to a lack
of intelligence). The JPTL includes the proposed means of prosecution (lethal
or nonlethal) and the components responsible for engaging the targets (including recommendations covering intelligence collection and additional weapons
restrictions relating to collateral damage estimation analysis).64
Because targets and the environment within which they are located change
continually and because military planners never will know everything there is to
know about a target or a target solution, target development is an ongoing process. The process takes time: to enable proper planning and to perform course
checks, legal reviews, proper target vetting, and more.65 An experienced targeting
professional comments, “More time has not always equated to greater success,
but nearly any U.S. or NATO targeting planner would see it as a significant plus.”66
As important as time, or perhaps even more important, is the intelligence
that supports target planning; the indispensable role of intelligence and the importance of time deserve separate attention. As part of that discussion, the paragraphs below elaborate on autonomous technologies for targeting, with a specific
focus on the intelligence branch and its role in target development.
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AUTONOMOUS TECHNOLOGIES FOR TARGETING
Although autonomous weapons have sparked serious debates about human control over the past five to ten years, autonomous technologies—some of which are
even weaponized—have been part of military processes for much longer. They
range from simple algorithms that support calculations to complex autonomous
technology that is used in modern unmanned combat aircraft (not to be confused
with “regular” remotely piloted aircraft systems, commonly known as drones).
An illustration of the former is the Capability Analysis Tool, an automated
weaponeering system that provides the standard automated methodology for
estimating the employment effectiveness of most nonnuclear, kinetic weapons.67
Another example is the software program called DCiDE, which is used for estimating collateral damage.68 Examples of an application of complex autonomous
technology in military systems are the American X47-B and the comparable
British system called Taranis, the Russian MiG Skat, the European nEUROn, and
the Chinese Anjian. These are unmanned combat air systems that can autonomously perform complex tasks, such as taking off from and landing on an aircraft
carrier, conducting midflight refueling, and taking evasive maneuvers. Some of
these systems are said to be capable of automatically identifying and targeting a
threat as well, after which the system will send the data back to a human operator to be verified and to (dis)approve the engagement.69 Autonomous behavior
is inherent in many defensive responses, such as defensive cyber autonomy and
defensive countermeasures in airplanes. Examples include aviation electronic
systems that respond immediately to jamming indications, up to and including
the deployment of defensive countermeasures, such as releasing chaff and flares,
with the aircrew only flicking a “consent” switch at the beginning of the mission.70
Additionally, defensive systems that can operate in a fully automated mode to
engage preprogrammed threats such as incoming missiles already have existed
for decades. Examples include the American Phalanx close-in weapon system
and well-known defensive ground systems, such as the surface-to-air Patriot missile battery and the Israeli Iron Dome; all can autonomously perform their own
search, detect, evaluation, track, engage, and kill assessment functions to defend
ships or ground areas against fast-moving and highly maneuverable threats.71
However, in circumstances of self-defense, no elaborate targeting process
is used to engage the target. There is reduced planning time and fewer policy
constraints. Therefore, situations of self-defense are not an adequate reflection
of targeting, and hence autonomous systems that are used for self-defense are
not included in this analysis. The scope of this article is limited to the tasks and
decisions that are made within the targeting process and are or could be considered critical functions of targeting. Consequently, the previously mentioned unmanned combat air vehicles that can autonomously perform tasks that generally
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are considered less critical (e.g., those that relate to flight or navigation) also will
not feature in the analysis that follows.72
Examples exist of both complex and relatively simple technologies that play a
role in the targeting process. Sometimes these technologies are called automated
or autonomous; sometimes they are described as learning, or as representing
some other form of artificial intelligence. Interpretational issues are at the heart
of this debate. The meanings of these technological and sometimes even philosophical terms are far from settled; they can have diverging meanings within
different disciplines and in different contexts, and most of them are just inherently complex.73 I am under no impression that this semantic dispute can and
should be solved here and now. Therefore, I will refer to all these technologies
(irrespective of whether they are considered automated, learning, autonomous,
or some other form of AI) as autonomous technologies. Regardless of what type
of technologies are already existent or under development, the principal concern
should be to consider these technologies within the decision-making processes
within which they will be used; how we as humans decide to deal with these
technologies is more important than debates about the technologies themselves.
In the paragraphs that follow, for each technological development discussed, the
relevant context of targeting will be clarified so the impact of the technology can
be assessed within an analysis of the process by which it will be used.
The Indispensable Role of Intelligence
Intelligence plays a role in each phase of the targeting process. In some, intelligence takes the lead (e.g., target development); some phases involve a mix of intelligence and operations (e.g., weaponeering); and in others the intelligence role
is one of true support (e.g., force planning and assignment or monitoring tasks).74
Most often, intelligence is described as providing targeting support. This is a
correct statement; however, it does not do justice to the real value that intelligence
provides to the targeting process. Generally, the most important role of intelligence in targeting is to provide commanders and their staffs with analysis of key
aspects of the operational environment to assist them in their decision-making
process.75 As mentioned above, although this role may seem merely “supportive,”
some estimate that targeting is 85 to 90 percent an intelligence job.76 Irrespective
of whether these percentages accurately reflect the actual role of the intelligence
branch, it is clear that intelligence plays a vital, continuous, and often decisive role
in the targeting process.
The value of intelligence has been an ever-present subject in military discussions. Sun Tzu wrote that if you know the enemy and know yourself, in a hundred
battles you will never be defeated.77 George Washington agreed: “The necessity
of procuring good intelligence is apparent and need not be further argued.”78
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Throughout history, no one indeed has seemed to argue the point, although
Clausewitz was somewhat critical, writing, “Many intelligence reports in war are
contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain.”79 From these observations it can be concluded that intelligence is of great importance, but goodquality intelligence can be hard to come by. In addition, having more intelligence
at one’s disposal does not guarantee strategic success. The quality of intelligence
matters at least as much as the quantity.80
About fifteen years ago “[w]e moved from ‘Industrial age’ to ‘Information age’
targeting . . . as the combination of new aircraft that could carry large numbers
of smaller precision-guided weapons, better and more multi-source intelligence,
and the ability to pass dynamic target updates from multiple sensors to airborne
aircraft in minutes vastly increased the number of targets that could be struck
on a given mission,” says Lieutenant General John N. T. “Jack” Shanahan, Director for Defense Intelligence (Warfighter Support) at the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.81 The transformation to the information
age implied, and became manifested in, information becoming the driving factor
in warfare.82 The advent of unmanned vehicles carrying improved sensors not
only increased transparency on the battlefield but also enhanced the precision of
weapons systems and the speed of command by compressing the time to complete decision-making loops.83
This capability increased the demand for intelligence for targeting, while concurrently the use of these unmanned platforms vastly increased the amount of
data produced. When this was combined with increases in other types of data—
most significantly, the data from open sources such as the Internet—analysts
began to be overwhelmed by the constant flow of vast amounts of data, which
made it impossible for them to analyze it all and convert it into information and
intelligence.84 Simultaneously, battle spaces are changing rapidly and contested
areas demand accelerated decision-making—now, and likely even more so in the
future.
Practice has taught us that, whether referring to NATO as a whole or to
individual member states, current targeting enterprises are not prepared to
handle the demands of future conflicts, beyond perhaps a counterterrorism or
contingency operation that is limited in both scope and scale. NATO member
states learned in the Balkans in the late 1990s, in Libya in 2011, and again at the
beginning of Operation INHERENT RESOLVE that it is far too easy to overestimate
targeting capacity, and as a result to run out of prepared targets to hit within days
or at most weeks of commencing an operation. To bring NATO’s targeting capacity up to speed and solve the multiple challenges the organization is facing today,
nations cannot simply throw more people at the problem. Although having more
and more-experienced personnel would definitely improve targeting, it will not
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be nearly sufficient. As General Shanahan explains, “The reality is that the supply
will never equal the demand. Not now. And definitely not five years from now.”85
The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff also acknowledged this in Joint Vision 2010, which
explained that “instead of relying on massed forces . . . , we will achieve massed
effects in other ways. Information superiority and advances in technology will
enable us to achieve the desired effects.”86
So if human personnel—even assuming they have the requisite expertise—
are not expected to be sufficient to solve the problem, autonomous technology
becomes a major driver. This has caused militaries worldwide to invest in these
technologies for military purposes.87
Artificial Intelligence for Intelligence
Militaries recognize that, among other benefits in both the intelligence and
operations fields, technology enables commanders and their staffs to access—
sometimes in near-real time—large amounts of intelligence about the operational
environment, which can assist them in planning, deciding on, and executing
an attack effectively and in accordance with the relevant law and policy. The
technology also enables analysts to convert raw data into actionable intelligence
that can be used for targeting. Hence, intelligence is of the greatest value when
humans and technology join forces. In this information age, the intelligence
branch seems to be one of the first military disciplines to experience the effects
of this technology on both the quantity and quality of its work—both positively
and negatively.
Although the massive increase in data available might seem a positive development, the positive results remain limited if the data cannot be processed for use.
With over 1.8 billion images captured on mobile phones daily, we can speak of a
real data explosion.88 Last year, Cisco (a company that provides Internet traffic
forecasts) presented a white paper claiming that “[i]t would take an individual
more than 5 million years to watch the amount of video that will cross global IP
[Internet protocol] networks each month in 2020. Every second, nearly a million
minutes of video content will cross the network by 2020.”89 This estimate covers all IP traffic, not just the data relevant to military operations; even so, open
sources are becoming an increasingly relevant data source in modern operations.
Furthermore, information overload is also experienced through other intelligence sources that are strictly military. For example, the amount of full-motion
video (FMV) produced by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has risen sharply
over the past ten to fifteen years. The amount of footage from 2008 already would
take a single human being—who never slept or blinked—twenty-four years to
watch.90 Analysis of all this material is performed by hundreds of young military
personnel, mostly Air Force airmen at present, but increasingly soldiers, sailors,
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and Marines who view each video as it comes in.91 Yet even then only a small
amount of the data (10–15 percent) can be processed.92 The estimate of footage
from 2008 already made people wonder: How long will humans be used to review
these videos? Today, almost a decade later, very little about this manual process
has changed, even though technology has continued to evolve, thereby amassing more and more data—without assisting in the processing, exploiting, and
disseminating thereof. Presently, monitoring, messaging, and reporting on one
FMV feed from a single UAV takes a minimum of three military technicians (not
counting additional personnel for supervision, maintenance, and the like).93 This
is a strenuous, labor-intensive effort that would be more effective if supported by
technology.
This is one of the reasons the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) established
the Algorithmic Warfare Cross-Functional Team (AWCFT), also known as Project Maven. The overall aim of this team is to accelerate DoD’s integration of AI,
big data, and machine learning across operations to maintain advantages over
increasingly capable adversaries.94 Its first task is to field technology to automate
processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) for theater- and tactical-level
UAVs collecting FMV in support of the Defeat-ISIS campaign.95 Currently, analysts spend 80 percent of their time doing mundane administrative tasks associated with staring at FMV (e.g., look, count, characterize) and typing data manually
into a spreadsheet.96 Although it is necessary to conduct such tasks, commanders
and Pentagon leaders do not consider them a good use of their analysts’ time.97 So
instead, they are introducing autonomous intelligence processing to help reduce
the burden on the human analysts, augment actionable intelligence, and enhance
military decision-making.98 An example would be technology that can identify
relevant activity and then label the data. It is a small portion of what General
Shanahan—the man tasked with finding the new technology—expects the project will be able to accomplish in the future, but it is a first step that is necessary to
demonstrate the utility of AI for targeting.99 “You have to go after a manageable
problem, solve it, show early wins and then start to open Pandora’s box and go
after all of these other challenges across the department,” says Shanahan.100
One of the main challenges that could be tackled next is the automation of
TSAs.101 As mentioned previously, conducting TSAs is a very critical task—
potential targets are derived from them—but it is also very complex and timeconsuming. Target systems such as air-defense forces, lines of communication,
enemy leadership, and ideology exist and operate within a complex system-ofsystems context having numerous interrelationships and dependencies that may
not be readily apparent, may require analysis of large amounts of data, and may
not conform to preconceived notions and biases.102 TSA therefore requires thorough analysis of a broad variety of intelligence sources and rigorous objectivity
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to reveal vulnerabilities in one seemingly unrelated system.103 In addition, this
needs to be a continuous process to enable adjustment to dynamic circumstances.
This is even more difficult when combating insurgents; for example, a hospital
may be used as a command center, but a week later the command center may
have moved and the local population may have begun to reinhabit the facility.104
Thus, TSA constitutes a substantial task—and with the limited number of
targeteers that Western armed forces, particularly NATO, have now, it is almost
impossible to perform. This would be even more problematic in a scenario in
which NATO was at war against a near-peer opponent. As stated previously,
states cannot bring NATO’s targeting capacity up to speed and solve the multiple
challenges the organization faces today simply by throwing more people at the
problem. Autonomous technology, however, could speed up the process, processing large amounts of data so as to discern interrelationships and dependencies
that human beings would fail to recognize. Additionally, AI is expected to play
a vital role in planning; it would make it possible to run hundreds, or even millions, of simulation exercises to understand the potential effects of actions against
targets across a given network.105
Because the TSA process not only entails the objective assessment of data for
generic target system analysis but also recommends targeting strategies tied to
the commander’s objectives and guidance, any autonomous technology conducting this process would have to be capable of performing complex assessments or
assisting a targeteer in doing so. So far, no such military technology is in use, but
the importance of TSA for target development, and targeting more broadly, and
the many ways in which autonomous technologies could support the process
mean that TSA is an area that soon could see demands for, or even application
of, autonomous technologies.
A different, but similar, project of the U.S. Intelligence Community focuses
on finding mobile missile launchers, then flagging them for analysts anytime
they transition from a benign to a threatening posture. Basically, this means
that the program must be taught what “normal” looks like to be able to flag the
difference. According to former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work,
this type of automation could prove most beneficial at the National GeospatialIntelligence Agency (NGA), which gathers images from America’s satellites,
analyzes them, and feeds the information to the military and the Intelligence
Community for targeting and other purposes.106 The NGA also deals with data
sets so large and complex that they are difficult to process using traditional dataprocessing applications (so-called big data). To conduct tasks such as making
maps, knowing the environment, and navigating the planet, as well as understanding activity, threats, and changes, the NGA too is exploring technological
solutions. For example, the NGA is developing a software program that can
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determine a geolocation from a picture that was taken of the area of interest.
This technology would enable faster searches of the data to determine a subject’s
location.107 In practice, this could mean that a social-media picture of an area in
which, say, a missile launcher is identified could be used to search through massive amounts of data to determine the location of the launcher within minutes
(depending on the search box).
These types of technologies are often neglected in the discourse on autonomous weapons owing to the fact that they are not weaponized.108 However, to disregard such technologies would be to ignore their potential. These technologies
will be vital for target development; in particular, they will be closely connected
to target selection, since the actionable intelligence produced by the humanmachine collaboration very well could result in targets being selected for engagement on the battlefield. These technologies are designed to give the military a
better understanding of what is happening on the battlefield, helping humans to
react more quickly than their adversaries, thus giving them a better chance to win
a war—or, better yet, to deter an enemy from attacking at all.109 Automating decisions that have a direct causal link to weapons release might be most sensitive—
authorizing machines to kill humans is “a bridge too far” for most political and
military leaders—but technologies that can have a substantial effect on which
specific targets end up on the approved target list or technologies that determine
what data humans see and how they should conceive the battlefield can be just as
influential, potentially even more so.
Consider the effect of autonomous technologies that decide, out of large
amounts of data, what specific data to show to their operators and what data to
ignore, thereby influencing or shaping situational awareness. Another consideration relevant to assessing human control in the targeting process would be the
effect of data labeling on target selection. What labels are being applied (e.g.,
weapon, attack, combatant, hostile intent)? And how is this information presented
to the human; is there a risk of either automation bias toward or mistrust of the
system? One step further would be for target-support systems to suggest specific targets for engagement. Although a human being still would make the final
decision to approve or disapprove a proposed attack, the role that autonomous
technologies would have in target selection no longer can be ignored.
More importantly, if we fail to consider these types of technologies for intelligence tasks and the manner in which they are implemented within the military
architecture, we risk losing a valuable opportunity to examine potential ways to
manage them. A lot is being said about what the fight looks like now and what it
will look like in the future, but too little time is being spent on the middle piece—
the actual steps necessary to get there.110 The aforementioned projects constitute
such steps; they are the first attempts at integrating autonomous technologies
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into existing military architectures and processes—specifically the targeting
process. It is vital that we learn from these first attempts, understand the challenges they raise, and anticipate the ramifications thereof, because the next steps
certainly will seek ways to expand the use of such technology into areas beyond
intelligence.111
THE CONTROL ISSUE—NOW AND IN FUTURE TARGETING
In view of the targeting process and surveying current developments in the field
of autonomous technologies for targeting, a few main tentative conclusions about
the control issue can be drawn. These conclusions relate to implementing and
incorporating autonomous technologies in (1) the military mind-set, (2) military structures, and (3) decision-making processes. These areas of concern are
expected to be collectively relevant to solving the control issue.
However, as this article focuses on the targeting process, the next part of this
analysis will focus primarily on the effect of implementing autonomous technologies into that process. But before beginning this concluding analysis, let me
briefly address the challenges that arise out of implementing autonomous technologies into the military mind-set and the military structure.
Changing the Military Mind-Set
The military is well-known for its focus on hardware such as aircraft, satellites,
missiles, and other platforms and munitions. But advanced software technologies
are becoming more and more crucial to the success of today’s military. As a U.S.
Air Force general explains it, “The B-52 lived and died on the quality of its sheet
metal. Today our aircraft will live or die on the quality of our software.”112
Currently, there is a wealth of potential innovation in the commercial sector
that the military (at least Western, particularly U.S., armed forces) finds difficult
to identify and introduce into the defense system.113 If military services want to
take advantage of technological developments in the commercial field, they will
need to be fast and agile in identifying and incorporating emerging technologies,
as these commercial developments will be equally exploitable by many other states
and nonstate actors. This is a challenge for an institution that takes a slow and
deliberate approach to the acquisition and fielding of technologies.114 Furthermore, there is a need for militaries to change from having a hardware mind-set—
a platform-centric innovation and acquisition process—to being software-minded
and understanding the potential contributions and risks that autonomy and AI
can bring to military missions.115
This will require a fundamental change in mind-set, one that will be most
difficult to achieve; military historian Basil H. Liddell Hart famously observed
that “the only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to
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get an old one out.”116 Even though the military’s mission likely will never be fully
compatible with the commercial culture—which defense analyst Peter Singer
describes as “fast, flat in structure, and happy to fail and fail rapidly”—the ability
of militaries to take risks and adapt will prove critical to retaining a military edge
in this new environment.117
Dealing with the Military Structure
Transitioning from a hardware mind-set to a software mind-set will require some
significant changes to the military structure, as any step in the process would need
to be implemented across military branches to promote interoperability and effectiveness. However, military organizations often are very “stovepiped” and disjointed in structure. By way of illustration, a Pentagon official from the Joint Staff
Targeting Division explained that when DoD acquires new software it generally is
not compatible with the existing system.118 Continuing, he noted that every geographical combatant command (known as CENTCOM, EUCOM, AFRICOM,
etc.) has different architectures and can be developing tools to improve these
architectures independently.119 Thus, different developments are occurring at
different commands and within different services because they use different base
systems that are not compatible with another service’s or command’s systems.120
According to Dr. Bernadette Johnson of the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental, “Part of our problem is a legacy problem of the historical foundation of
our independent services, and if we were a fresh brand-new country standing up
today then we wouldn’t design the military in the way that we currently have it.”121
Clearly, this existing military structure makes implementing new technologies
across the board and achieving interoperability difficult.122
The Effect on Human Control in the Targeting Process
The third area of concern—but the primary one of this article—that should be
considered when implementing autonomous technologies is the process within
which these technologies operate. Current discussions focus on autonomous
weapons and ignore the type of autonomous technologies that this article discusses. One of the reasons for this exclusive and narrow focus on weapons and
the platforms that carry them seems to be that, like intelligence, these autonomous technologies are considered to have “supporting” functions, implying that
they support but do not replace a human decision. As a result, it is expected that a
human being remains accountable for any violations of the applicable law, policy,
or military ethics.123 Also, the level of risk in the event that the technology makes
a mistake is considered to be lower because the human will act as the ultimate
decision maker.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that even if these technologies are playing
a supporting role, and even if a human being ultimately makes the decisions,
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the technologies can influence critical targeting decisions—which could be
both positive and negative. On the one hand, autonomous technologies could
be beneficial, for example, in terms of speeding up the process and processing
large amounts of data to discern interrelationships and dependencies that human beings would fail to recognize. Western armed forces are struggling to keep
their targeting capacity up to speed, and the complexity, scope, and scale of the
targeting process mean that mistakes happen. Autonomous technologies provide
opportunities to improve this process and its results. On the other hand, implementing these technologies in the targeting process gives rise to additional and
new challenges with regard to human-machine interfaces, (incompatible) ethical
frameworks, trust issues, training, and more. These are all fundamental discussions that influence the manner in which the control issue is perceived. Although
solving all of them is beyond the scope of this article, some operational effects can
be identified that are relevant from a human-control perspective.
With the targeting process as the reference framework, one could conclude
that an effect of using increasingly autonomous technologies for targeting is that
human actors and technologies are becoming part of a long chain within which
decisions made by one link in the chain almost definitely will affect the control or
limit the decisions of others in the chain.124 In short, implementing autonomous
technologies will affect the control that human actors further down the chain
(i.e., within the targeting process) can exercise. This could result in a shift of
responsibilities that, for example, might generate an increase in responsibilities
for certain superiors or the developers of systems, but also could result in a lack
of accountability if the effects of implementing these technologies are not considered adequately before the technologies are introduced into the process. (This
issue is also closely related to the military structure.)
Even without autonomous technologies, the targeting process is an inherently complex process within which many individuals make numerous decisions
on a daily basis. Hence, responsibility for critical decisions typically is spread
across the entire process. On the one hand, this provides multiple opportunities
to exercise control and apply checks and balances. On the other hand, it should
be no surprise that such complex processes—within which a conglomeration of
cultural, organizational, educational, and linguistic differences are at play—are
prone to human errors. Mistakes are made; the question is whether autonomous
technologies can reduce these mistakes or ultimately will cause more, or perhaps
different, mistakes.125
Furthermore, it should be noted that the use of autonomous technologies
changes the activities of human actors; such technologies do not simply supplant
the human beings, who simultaneously relinquish all the responsibilities and
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control they exercised previously.126 To the contrary, the proper use of autonomous technologies may lead to improved situational awareness and a better understanding of the operational environment that may even enable human beings
to enhance their control. Nevertheless, this is not without risk; the redistribution
of existing tasks and the creation of new ones change the relationship between
human actors and technologies, which can give rise to a transformation in
decision-making processes.127 If these transformations are not considered thoroughly, the use of autonomous technologies could ultimately result in an unacceptable loss of human control. Whether humans remain in control of critical
targeting decisions depends on how well they succeed at creating a framework
within which this control can continue to be exercised alongside the use of increasingly autonomous technologies.
So far, no state has addressed these concerns comprehensively and effectively.
However, some first attempts at creating a framework can be observed on the current political landscape, where a significant number of states seem to be open to
prescribing self-imposed restrictions on the development and use of autonomous
weapons, with specific reference to human control.128 In fact, some states already
have gone one step further and implemented certain requirements in their national policies. The U.S. DoD, for instance, published a policy that directs that
“autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems shall be designed to allow
commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment
over the use of force.”129 And according to the Netherlands, “meaningful human
control is required in the deployment of autonomous weapon systems.”130 Even
though the number of such government policies currently is small—most governments merely commit to official statements or working papers presented in
expert meetings held under the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)—the majority of these policies or statements include a reference to
the relevance of human control.
Hence, nations seem committed to keeping human beings in the decisionmaking loop for important targeting decisions—at least for now. However, it
could very well be that, if a major conflict arises, all bets will be off, with states
feeling forced into more reliance on autonomous systems because their adversaries are willing to take more risk.131 Considering warfare’s historical actionreaction cycle, algorithm-versus-algorithm warfare between two adversaries may
not be too far off.132
However, this is not an inevitable result of these technologies; rather, it is a
choice that human beings make if they decide to introduce these technologies into
the targeting process without considering—or after deliberately accepting—the
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consequences. In the current situation and for Western armed forces, this is not
likely to be a deliberate choice, but it very well could be the result of a misunderstanding of the issue that leads to an erroneous method of dealing with these
new technologies. For example, by focusing merely on weaponized technologies,
states, participants, and commentators fail to take into account other significant
phases of the targeting process and the technologies that affect critical targeting
decisions in other ways. What they do not seem to realize is that focusing solely
on weapons employment is like assembling a jigsaw puzzle while staring only at
one corner—through a soda straw.
Therefore, this article advises taking an expansive view, considering the targeting process as a reference framework under which to examine holistically the
effect of autonomous technologies on human control. While doing so, governments could learn from current projects that aim to implement autonomous
technologies in targeting, such as Project Maven.
They also should consider learning from previous experiences with implementing new technologies in the targeting process. For example, the Center for
Naval Analyses (CNA) concluded in its report on mitigating civilian casualties
resulting from the use of drones that “[f]ailure to recognize and mitigate factors
besides the platform in the targeting process resulted in an increased risk to
civilians from the use of drones, despite some desirable characteristics of those
systems.”133 Research into operational data from U.S. drone missions in Pakistan
and Afghanistan confirmed that “reducing civilian casualties depends on the
entire engagement process, including planning and training considerations, not
simply on characteristics of the weapon platform.”134 Although the platforms
under discussion in this article are not the same, much of the decision-making
process is. Hence, these assessments could help states understand the changing
dynamics in the targeting process caused or exacerbated by the introduction of
new technologies.
To conclude, the reality is that autonomous technologies already are and will
continue to be important for targeting. Therefore, safely incorporating these
technologies into targeting is not a concern for the future but a challenge that
should be addressed today rather than tomorrow. States that claim that human
control or judgment is essential to making proper targeting decisions often
simultaneously pursue autonomous technologies, claiming that these technologies represent the future of targeting. It could be concluded from this article that
one approach does not need to preclude the other, but we ought to be mindful
of the effects that autonomous technologies will have on our decision-making
processes.
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The development and use of autonomous weapons have created a host of legal,
political, and ethical questions and concerns that continue to be scrutinized, primarily within the CCW process. However, the annual deliberations that are held
under this framework convention have resulted in little progress over the past
four years. Nonetheless, so far over two dozen states have endorsed the notion of
“meaningful human control” or a similar concept that ought to prevent humans
from losing control over autonomous weapons. Yet how the concept should be
interpreted and applied remains vague and disputed.
This article has argued that the principal concern should be to consider these
autonomous technologies within the decision-making processes in which they
will be used, because that is the primary context within which their effects can
be assessed properly. The reference framework that I propose is the targeting
process. Yet there appears to be a considerable lack of knowledge about targeting among many groups and individuals, many considering it to be merely the
practice of destroying enemy forces and equipment. This historical approach is
no longer suitable for describing contemporary targeting.
Today, targeting should be perceived as a deliberate, analytical, and iterative
process, rather than an isolated tactical action. It aims to achieve specified effects
on and beyond the battlefield by means of not only classic kinetic lethal actions
but also nonmilitary, nonkinetic, and nonlethal activities.
This process begins on a political-strategic level, at which military intervention is decided on and political guidance and overarching military objectives are
formulated. This guidance is passed down to the operational level, at which time
the targeting process commences. Through the six phases that follow, military
forces formulate operational objectives, select and prioritize targets, match them
with the appropriate response, consider operational requirements and capabilities, execute the mission, and assess whether the desired effects were achieved.
The targeting process provides an appropriate and holistic framework to
consider concepts such as “meaningful human control” or “appropriate levels
of human judgment.” Human control and judgment are exercised within this
process, and hence the targeting process should be considered in its entirety to
determine the effect of increasingly autonomous technologies on human control.
Also, inquiry should not be limited to weapons deployment but expanded to
the entire targeting process; such an expansive view demonstrates that critical
targeting decisions are made throughout the process, so the scope of the control
issue exceeds the mere use of autonomous weapons. In this context, the detailed
analysis of phase 2, target development, not only demonstrates the complexity of
the targeting process; it moreover confirms that critical targeting functions need
have no direct relation to weapons or kinetic action. It also redirects attention
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to the targeting role of a military branch—intelligence—that largely has been
ignored in the debate on autonomous weapons.
With the advent of the information age, the intelligence branch appears to
be one of the first military disciplines to experience the effects of technology on
both the quantity and quality of its work, both positively and negatively. Western
armed forces cannot deal with the targeting challenges they face simply by throwing more people at them, so states are driven to invest in technological solutions.
The U.S. DoD’s AWCFT—tasked with integrating AI, big data, and machine
learning across operations—provides an example. One of its first efforts has been
to automate intelligence processing to reduce the burden on human analysts,
augment actionable intelligence, and enhance military decision-making. This
is only one of many ongoing research and development projects that Western
states—and most certainly many others—are pursuing.135
Nevertheless, these types of technologies often are neglected in the discourse
on autonomous weapons because they are not weaponized. This article establishes that disregarding these technologies is a mistake. First, these autonomous
technologies used for target development have an effect on which specific targets
end up on the approved target list by determining what data humans see and
how they should conceive the battlefield. The fact that these technologies are
not weaponized is irrelevant, as their tasks are potentially even more critical for
targeting than those of their weaponized cousins. Second, these projects provide
an opportunity to examine challenges and potential ways of dealing with the implementation of increasingly autonomous technologies in the targeting process.
A closer look identifies three main challenges. First, as advanced software
technologies become more and more crucial to the success of today’s military—
assuming the various services want to take advantage of these technological
developments—militaries need to change from a hardware to a software mindset, since the ability of militaries to take risks and adapt will prove critical for
retaining an edge in this new environment. Second, the military structure is very
stovepiped and disjointed, making it difficult to implement new technologies
across the board. Third, implementing autonomous technologies in the military
targeting process will be a task of significant difficulty. Even without autonomous
technologies, the targeting process is an inherently complex process within which
many individuals make numerous decisions on a daily basis, inescapably resulting in mistakes.
Although imperfect, the targeting process serves as a reliable basis on which to
analyze the effect of increasingly autonomous technologies, work toward better
protection of civilians, and preserve military effectiveness. Autonomous technologies could improve this process, while, at the same time, there is a risk that
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the use of autonomous technologies could ultimately still result in an unacceptable loss of human control because we were not sufficiently mindful of the consequences of these technologies with regard to our decision-making processes.
One effect of using increasingly autonomous technologies for targeting is that
human actors and technologies are becoming part of a joint chain in which the
decision of one almost certainly will affect the control or limit the decisions of
others involved in the chain. Also, autonomous technologies change the activities
of human actors; they do not supplant those actors while simultaneously relieving them of all the responsibilities and control they exercised previously. The
use of autonomous technologies prompts a change in the relationship between
human actors and technologies that will require a transformation in decisionmaking processes. If these changes and transitions are not considered properly
or are ignored altogether, the use of autonomous technologies for targeting could
ultimately result in a loss of human control.
So far, no state has addressed these concerns comprehensively and effectively,
but some states have made initial, minor attempts at creating a framework. Such
states seem to be open to prescribing informal and formal self-imposed restrictions on the development and use of autonomous weapons, with specific reference to human control. However, if a major conflict arises all such self-imposed
restrictions—such as the need for meaningful human control—very well may be
discarded, potentially resulting in an unacceptable loss of human control over
critical targeting decisions in the targeting process.
This concern may turn out to be justified, but, as I argue in this article, this is
not an inevitable result of the development and use of these technologies. Instead,
whether humans remain in control of critical targeting decisions will depend on
how well they succeed at creating a framework within which this control can
continue to be exercised alongside the use of increasingly autonomous technologies. Even though the targeting process creates a structure that provides a basis
for negotiating, exercising, and maintaining this control, we also should be honest about our targeting capacity—and the limitations thereof—and about the
complexity of organizing and executing military operations—and the mistakes
that result from that. Using the targeting process as a reference framework thus
creates opportunities for human beings to remain in control of increasingly autonomous technologies, as long as we assess it holistically and do not ignore the
complexities and challenges inherent in these complex enterprises.
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NOTES
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completion.
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